On 24 September, 2025, a Single-Judge Bench of Karnataka High Court delivered its judgement in X Corp v Union of India (WP 7405/2025), on the petition filed by X Corp (formerly Twitter) challenging the constitutional validity of using the Sahyog Portal to take down content under the Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021.
The case dealt with crucial questions on free speech, intermediary liability, and regulation of the internet. X Corp had argued that content takedowns can only be issued under Section 69A of the IT Act, and the Government defended the portal as a facilitative tool to collaborate actions to curb unlawful online content.
Rejecting the petition, the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka upheld the validity of the Sahyog portal and held that foreign companies like X Corp cannot claim protection of fundamental rights under Article 19, which are only available to citizens of India. The High Court, in its judgement, also emphasised the need for caution in applying foreign jurisprudence to the Indian context. X Corp has announced that it intends to appeal the decision of the Single-Judge Bench.
Found below is SFLC.in’s analysis of the judgement, as well as comprehensive summary of the Hon’ble High Court’s rationale, presented in issue-by-issue format. Through our analysis, we find that the Hon’ble High Court has omitted to address key averments by the intervenors in the matter, and omitted to consider that the regulatory regime under Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) remains unchanged except for the Intermediary rules. We believe that the judgement of Hon’ble High Court, by upholding a state action that side-steps established statutory guidelines and judicial precedent, sets a dangerous precedent that could have long-term implications on the fundamental rights of citizens.
Background of the Case:
Case Number: WP 7405/2025
Court: Karnataka High Court
Date of Judgement: 24 September 2025
Quorum: Justice M. Nagaprasanna
Petitioner: X Corp, represented by Senior Advocate K.G. Raghavan
Respondent: Union of India, represented by Senior Advocate Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India
The Petitioner X Corp. is an American tech and social media company established in 2023 as a successor to Twitter, Inc. It is headquartered in Texas, but operates the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) globally, including in India. The intervenors in support of X Corp, DIGIPUB News India Foundation, is an association of 92 digital news media publishers.
The present case arises out of multiple take-down notices that have been filed against the Petitioner under Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (“IT Rules, 2021”) through the Sahyog portal. Rule 3(1)(d) outlines an intermediary’s responsibility to remove or disable access to unlawful content.
The Sahyog portal was launched by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2024 for central and state ministries, and local police forces, to expedite blocking and takedown orders issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, (“IT Act, 2000”). Section 79(3)(b) conditionally exempts intermediaries from the ‘safe harbour’ protecting against liability for third-party content on their platforms, granted under Section 79. The portal came about after an order from the Delhi High Court in Shabhana v Govt of NCT of Delhi (2024) noting the need to reduce delays in platform compliance with such requests. Sahyog is maintained by the Indian Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), and brings together all authorised agencies under the IT Act, 2000 along with intermediaries and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) under one roof. Through the RTI filed by SFLC.in, it has come to light that since its operation, a total of 179 requests have been sent through the Sahyog portal to 9 intermediaries out of 66 intermediaries registered.
X Corp sought the following reliefs from the Karnataka High Court:
(a) a declaration that Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 does not confer authority to issue information blocking orders under the IT Act, 2000 and a further declaration that information blocking orders can only be issued under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 read with the rules framed thereunder.
(b) a declaration that Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 is ultra vires the IT Act, 2000 or unconstitutional. In the alternative it also seeks a prayer to read down Rule 3(1)(d) by declaring that Rule 3(1)(d) does not independently authorize the Respondents to issue information blocking orders.
(c) a declaration that the censorship portal (Sahyog Portal) is ultra vires the IT Act, 2000 and thereby unconstitutional.
Averments made by the Parties [Pages 14 – 26]:
The contentions of the Petitioner and Intervenors were that:
- In Shreya Singhal Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court held that content takedowns can be ordered only through the narrowly-defined procedure set out in Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 or in compliance with a competent court’s order. The Supreme Court also upheld the procedural safeguards provided in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (“Blocking Rules, 2009”) [Para 4.1]. Whether American jurisprudence has developed after Reno v. ACLU (1997) is of no consequence, as what is binding is the findings of the Apex Court in Shreya Singhal alone [Para 7.2].
- Section 79(3)(b) was not envisioned as an empowering provision that allows the government to issue orders to block access to information or take down objectionable material. It is an exemption provision that should not be stretched to confer blocking power, and must be read as referring only to a court order, an order under Section 69A, or an order under the Blocking Rules, 2009 [Para 4.1].
- While the government can communicate the unlawful nature of the online content to the intermediaries, there is no law authorising any of the Executive Officers or Police Officers in every State/Union Territory to issue directions to block information [Para 4.2].
- Free Speech is undoubtedly a right of the intermediary platform, and the impugned State action amounts to unreasonable restriction on this right, contrary to the spirit of Article 19(1)(a). Further, the use of take down orders by “all and sundry” is a straight breach of Article 14 [Para 4.4]. Even if Article 19 freedoms are not available to a foreign company, Article 14 pervades through every action of the State, and such actions must not be arbitrary. The present action is arbitrary as take down orders are done at the whim and fancy of Nodal Officers [Para 7.1].
- The decision on the lawfulness of any information is made not according to law but according to the discretion of a Nodal Officer. As per the Nodal Officer, if the information uploaded on the platform is unlawful, it has to be taken down, and If an intermediary fails to take down this unlawful content, it loses safe harbour protections and becomes liable for prosecution. Rule 3(1)(d), which places this power in the Nodal Officer, is therefore unconstitutional, running afoul of the findings in Shreya Singhal [Para 4.5]. The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal had permitted blocking orders under the Blocking Rules, 2009, and directed that Section 79 is to be read with Section 69A. Rule 3(1)(d), which claims this same power in a manner not envisaged in the IT Act, 2000, must be struck down as it is ultra vires [Para 7.3].
- The Intervenors argued that these orders affect not just platforms but also content creators, whose work is removed without notice, threatening their freedom of speech under Article 19 [Para 5.2]. Further, even if Article 19 is not considered available for the petitioner, a foreign company, the fundamental rights for free speech and expression are, in fact and in law, available to the intervenors, who are citizens engaging in protected speech and who can seek redressal for any violation of Article 19(1)(a) [Para 8.1].
- The use of Section 79(3)(b) for content takedowns bypasses the procedural safeguards under Section 69A and the Blocking Rules, 2009 that form checks and balances against unfettered blocking power, and this creates an unconstitutional parallel regime in violation of the ruling in Shreya Singhal. Without procedural safeguards, such State action becomes arbitrary, violating Article 14 of the Constitution [Para 8.2].
The contentions of the Respondent State were that:
- There have been many changes since the time of Shreya Singhal. The Indian internet landscape today is completely different from then, and the userbase has nearly quadrupled in size [Para 6.1]. Further, the judgement of the American Supreme Court in Reno, that was followed in Shreya Singhal, and the free speech doctrine observed in that case has not been followed since even in American jurisprudence, as the entire world is grappling with the menace of social media posts [Para 6.3].
- The First Amendment to the Indian Constitution was carried out to place further restrictions on the freedom of speech under Article 19, owing to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Romesh Thappar State of Madras (1950) [Para 6.2].
- Section 79 provides a ‘safe harbour’ to intermediaries, but the other provisions of Section 79 clearly indicate that this ‘safe harbour’ would be lost if unlawful content is not taken down from their platforms [Para 6.3].
- The Petitioner is an American company that does not have a registered office in India or operate a business here. The Petitioner cannot claim the protection of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. These rights are only available to individual citizens of the country, and only they are entitled to exercise these rights and seek their protection [Para 6.4]. An Indian company cannot knock at the door of the American Supreme Court and ask for free speech rights contrary to their laws. The rule of law must prevail over the rights of citizens, as even freedom of speech is reasonably restricted [Para 6.6].
- Further, the law followed in Shreya Singhal, as submitted by the Petitioner, is based on an interpretation of American jurisprudence in Reno. The Apex Court from 1950 onwards have consistently held that India’s jurisprudence should not be dependent on American jurisprudence. India has borrowed fundamental rights from the bill of rights, but that does not mean that we are governed by what American courts lay down [Para 6.5].
- Nodal Officers are appointed under the Statute and they have statutory duties to meet. What is unlawful is already defined under the IT Act, 2000 and none of the takedown orders are made under the whim and fancy of these officers. Statutory procedure is followed, and the orders only touch upon unlawful information like “defaming the Nation”, “showing the Nation in a poor state”, or any information that has “propensity to create unrest” or “which would bring down the integrity of the Nation” [Para 6.6].
Verdict [Pages 346 – 351]:
The Court rejected the Petition, finding that:
- The Sahyog Portal is a lawful mechanism under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 and Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules 2021, aimed as an administrative convenience towards combat cybercrime;
- The guarantees under Article 19(1)(a) are only available to citizens, and are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), and that the Petitioner as an American Company is not entitled to Article 19 protections;
- Reliance is not to be placed on American free speech jurisprudence in Reno, as it cannot supplant Indian legal thought, and, even in the US, there has been a shift in judicial thought towards regulating speech;
- The ruling in Shreya Singhal, based on the now-repealed Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (“IT Rules, 2011”) and the reasoning from Reno, cannot control the IT Rules, 2021 which require their own interpretive framework.
On September 29, X Corp announced through its platform that they intend to appeal the decision of the Karnataka High Court, which they claim allows “millions of police officers to issue arbitrary takedown orders through … the Sahyog.”
Issues Framed, and Rationale of the Court:
1. Whether the march of human civilisation, from antiquity to the present digital age, has ever witnessed information and communication in an unregulated state, or whether regulation has been its constant companion across epochs? [Pages 28 – 37]
The Court traced the history of the evolution of communication systems from the 1700s to modern day. The Court observes that throughout time immemorial, developments in communication technology, from messengers to telegraphs to the internet, have been the subject of regulation in their time [Paras. 10.1 – 10.14].
2. Whether the regimes of regulation that prevailed in earlier times continue to subsist both within the local context of our polity and in the global order of nations? [Pages 38 – 46]
The judgement analyses the long history of communications regulation in the United States of America, ranging from the Postal Services Act, 1792 to the Take It Down Act, 2025. Through this analysis, it is seen that no mode of communication has ever been wholly unregulated even in the USA, which is the Petitioner’s home country. [Para 11.7]. Consequently, the Court observes that the Petitioner is subject to a regulatory regime in the US as well, but it cries foul of the laws in India notwithstanding its American compliance [Para 11.8]. Therefore, the judgement concludes that India, like other countries, has a framework of laws to regulate the flow of information to temper liberty and freedom with responsibility and accountability [Para 11.9].
SFLC.in Analysis: The Karnataka High Court omitted to adequately consider that the Take It Down Act is carefully tailored legislation to address one specific form of speech, i.e. non-consensual intimate imagery (also referred to as “revenge porn”) (both authentic and artificially generated), with the enforcement of the Take It Down Act being carried out by the Federal Trade Commission, rather than thousands of faceless nodal officers.
Further, the Petitioner did not seek an unregulated right to freedom of speech, but rather sought the establishment of procedurally rigorous regulations that align with the judicial interpretation of the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal. The Petitioner argued that the procedure for takedown orders described in Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 when read with the Blocking Rules, 2009, has been upheld by the Apex Court owing to its reasonableness in restricting free speech. The Karnataka High Court has not considered, on merits, the submission that Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 in conjunction with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 would be constitutionally invalid for issuing take down orders.
3. Whether the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is an unbridled entitlement or is hedged by the canopy of reasonable restrictions embodied in Article 19(2)? [Pages 47 – 143]
The constitutional guarantees that secure liberty to citizens are not absolute, and are accompanied by reasonable restrictions. Article 19(2) provides such limitations on all six freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, including the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The Karnataka High Court observes that Article 19(2), prior to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, only provided for restrictions under very limited heads: “matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.” The First Amendment broadened the scope of these restrictions [Para 12.1].
This shift, the High Court finds, was born out of judicial interpretations in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950). The Supreme Court in these matters had held that no law can be made to restrict freedom of speech unless solely under the heads listed in Article 19(2) (Pre-Amendment) [Para 12.2]. The First Amendment, the High Court observes, was the result of intense debates which concluded that while free speech is a natural right, no right is absolute, and that incitement to crimes must also be restricted; this led to the amendment to Article 19(2) that gave it its present form [Para. 12.4].
As the Petitioner’s submissions were primarily based on the interpretation of free speech in Shreya Singhal, the High Court examined the judicial thought before and after the Shreya Singhal judgement vis-a-vis Article 19(2) and the doctrine of free speech [Para 12.5]. By examining the rationale behind judicial pronouncements in State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1952), Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P. (1957), Virenda v. State of Punjab (1957), and Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960), the Court concludes that prior to Shreya Singhal, there was “a delicate, yet decisive line between the security of the State and public order,” observing that the latter involves preserving the safety and tranquillity of the ordinary citizen and preserving the peace of community life [Paras. 12.6 – 12.9]. The High Court compares this line of reasoning with certain judgements made after Shreya Singhal, namely Ajit Mohan v. Legislative Assembly, NCT of Delhi (2022), Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (2024), Ranveer Gautam Allahabadia v. Union of India (2025), observing that post-Shreya Singhal, the precedent warns against unchecked proliferation of speech in the digital age. According to the High Court, the current judicial thought is that such unregulated speech necessitates regulatory intervention to preserve order, decency, and integrity of democratic life. Therefore, the High Court concludes, free speech under Article 19(1)(a) cannot be unbridled, and must be regulated by reasonable restrictions [Paras. 12.12 – 12.15].
SFLC.in Analysis: The line of reasoning from Issues 1 through 3 focused on establishing the need for regulation of speech, through historical, comparative, and judicial analysis. However, this was not part of the contentions raised before the Court. The High Court missed to consider that the Petitioner already conceded this need for regulating free speech by affirming the constitutional validity of the blocking regime under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 read with the Blocking Rules, 2009. The Petitioner had argued that this mechanism, upheld in Shreya Singhal, has already met the requirement for “reasonable restrictions” under Article 19(2).
4. Whether the jurisprudential edifice of the United States may be transplanted without reservation or adaptation into the soil of Indian constitutional thought? [Pages 143 – 163]
The judgement in Shreya Singhal was broadly based on the judgement of the American Supreme Court in Reno. Hence, the High Court examined judicial precedents for whether American jurisprudence can be transplanted to the Indian context. In this regard, the High Court examines the judgements in Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra (1961), Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v. The Reserve Bank of India (1962), Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Limited v. State of Rajasthan (1963), Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr (1970), State of Bihar v. Union of India (1970), Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978), M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008), and Ramlila Maidan Incident, In Re (2012) [Paras. 13.1 – 13.10]. This establishes a long line of judicial thought against the concept of transplanting English and American rulings on an Indian matter, particularly in Constitutional matters [Para 13.11]. The High Court concludes that American doctrines, particularly in the realm of free speech, cannot be the yardstick to interpret provisions of the Indian Constitution [Para 13.13].
Additionally, it must be noted that the Counsel for the Respondents, the Solicitor General of India, had submitted on record that the Union of India is considering seeking a review of the Shreya Singhal judgement [Para 13.12]. The High Court declares that this judgement is not an interpretation of Shreya Singhal, as it is only concerned with transferring of American doctrine into Indian jurisprudence [Para 13.12].
SFLC.in Analysis: With regard to the Karnataka High Court’s findings in Issue 4, it is worthwhile to note that Indian Constitutional jurisprudence, from 1950 onwards, has referenced foreign developments in law and practice, particularly from the jurisdictions of the UK and the US. The Supreme Court Observer has also found that foreign cases were cited extensively in recent landmark constitutional matters. Further, Indian Courts have looked at American and UK jurisprudence not as binding precedent but as persuasive and informative examples of legal precedents, with many cases using the common law jurisprudence as a means of shaping Indian jurisprudence and caselaws, while adjusting it specifically to the Indian context. By framing the issue as examining whether American jurisprudence can be “transplanted” into the Indian context, the Karnataka High Court appears to cherry pick from only those judgments which have cited caution in adopting foreign jurisprudence while completely ignoring the plethora of Indian judgments that have relied on foreign jurisprudence to inform and expand Indian jurisprudence.
India shares a common law tradition with the US, and the Fundamental Rights in Part III were inspired by the American Bill of Rights. In fact, the Constituent Assembly Debates referenced in the present judgement outline the relevance of American judicial thought, where Dr Ambedkar, the ‘Father of the Indian Constitution,’ emphasises that it is the American Supreme Court that clothed the barebones Constitution of the United States with “flesh and muscle” [Page 56]. Despite noting this in its judgment, the Hon’ble High Court has not to engaged with this line of thinking.
5. Whether there has been a discernible shift in American judicial philosophy in the aftermath of the celebrated decision in RENO v. ACLU, and if so, to what effect upon comparative jurisprudence? [Pages 163 – 195]
The Hon’ble High Court, citing the influence of Reno on the judgement in Shreya Singhal, describes the change in American legal thought post-Reno owing to the rapid development of the internet into a “vast and omnipresent sphere of human interaction” [Para 14.1]. By examining the rationale of the American Supreme Court in Moody v NetChoice (2024), TikTok v. Garland (2025), and Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton (2025), the Hon’ble High Court concludes that Reno is now considered vintage in American jurisprudence owing to the sharp divergence of the modern internet from what it was at the time of Reno [Paras 14.2 – 14.5].
The Hon’ble High Court also examines European jurisprudence on the regulation of free speech. It looks at Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine (2011), Delfi AS v. Estonia (2015), Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (2016), and Sanchez v. France (2023) [Paras. 14.6 – 14.9]. Through this analysis, the Hon’ble Court finds that the evolution in judicial thought away from the principles in Reno is reflective of a global shift towards regulation of a modern, all-pervasive internet. Hence, the Court concludes, any judgement predicated on Reno, like Shreya Singhal, is to be “restricted as one rendered when the internet was not all pervasive” [Para 14.9].
SFLC.in Analysis: Strikingly, while rejecting the idea of “transplanting” American jurisprudence in relation to foreign precedents that speak in favour of free speech, the Hon’ble High Court nonetheless finds it appropriate to reference subsequent American and European caselaws to underscore the significance of regulating free speech. This approach suggests a selective engagement with foreign legal principles depending on the context and purpose of the judicial reasoning.
6. What were the rules that fell for consideration in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, and whether the rules now occupying the field are materially distinct, thereby demanding a fresh interpretative lens? [Pages 195 – 229]
The Hon’ble High Court describes the history of the regulatory regime at the time of Shreya Singhal, noting that the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgement was concerned with Sections 66A, 69A, and 79 of the IT Act, 2000, the Blocking Rules, 2009, and the IT Rules, 2011 [Paras. 15.1 – 15.3]. The Hon’ble High Court states that while Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act, 2000 and the Blocking Rules, 2009 continue to exist as they were during Shreya Singhal, the IT Rules, 2011 have been replaced by the IT Rules, 2021 [Para 15.3]. As the challenge involves questions on the constitutional validity of Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021, the High Court compares the rule with its equivalent part in the IT Rules, 2011. Through this comparison, the Hon’ble High Court notes the mandated due diligence and additional conditions imposed for compliance under the IT Rules, 2021, concluding that there has been a sea-change in the rules regime since the time of Shreya Singhal [Para 15.5].
SFLC.in Analysis: The Hon’ble High Court has erred in characterising the regulatory regime now as “completely different” from that during Shreya Singhal. While the IT Rules, 2011 have been superseded by the IT Rules, 2021, the bedrock on which Shreya Singhal stands – Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act, 2000, and the Blocking Rules, 2009 – remains as they were in 2015, without any amendments. By giving primacy to the changed rules, the Hon’ble High Court has side-stepped the constitutional analysis of whether the issuing of blocking orders under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d) violates Article 19(2), and failed to adequately consider the effect of this regime on the constitutionally valid procedure under Section 69A and the Blocking Rules, 2009.
7. Whether the present challenge to the rules is vitiated by alleged vagueness or whether the rules withstand the test of clarity and definiteness in law? [Pages 230 – 249]
The Hon’ble High Court notes that as the IT Rules, 2011 considered in Shreya Singhal have been replaced by the IT Rules, 2021, the effect of that judgement insofar as it concerns intermediaries should be restricted up to the enactment of the IT Rules, 2021, post which the same issues would be considered governed by the IT Rules, 2021 [Para 16.1]. The first limb of the Petitioner’s challenge is that Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 is to be declared unconstitutional, or read down as not authorising the issue of blocking orders independently. The second limb of the challenge is that Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 should be declared as not empowering the issue of information blocking orders, with a further declaration that such orders can only be issued under Section 69A of the same Act. The Sahyog portal is prayed to be declared ultra vires the IT Act, 2000 and unconstitutional [Para 16.2].
The Petitioner contends that the provision forms a “Catch-22” situation, where unquestioning compliance infringes on free speech rights, but they have to obey the orders or lose safe harbour. The ground of the challenge is that the IT Rules, 2021 are vague and susceptible to arbitrariness. The Hon’ble High Court, in continuation of its previous analysis, asserts that both the Rules, 2011 and 2021, are completely different when juxtaposed with each other. The Hon’ble High Court rejects the submission that the Rules are similar and that the findings on the IT Rules, 2011 in Shreya Singhal ought to be paraphrased to the IT Rules, 2021 as well [Para 16.6].
On the question of vagueness, the High Court, relying on AK Roy v. Union of India (1982) and Benilal v. State of Maharashtra (1995), held that the legislature may employ generic words to convey its policy and intent, and that this would not make the provision vague and therefore unconstitutional. It may be a matter of judicial construction. Further, the term ‘public order’ emanates from the constitutional fountainhead of Article 19(2). Hence, the High Court concludes that Rule 3(1)(d) is not vague and therefore does not violate the tenets of Article 14 [Paras. 16.8 – 16.10]. Further, the Hon’ble High Court firmly states that reading down the provision would have to follow certain criteria as defined in Arap Bhuyan v. State of Assam (2023), and as the meaning of the IT Rules, 2021 is plain and unambiguous, it cannot be read down [Para 16.11].
Of particular interest is the Hon’ble High Court’s observation with respect to the different blocking order regimes under Section 69A and Section 79. The Hon’ble High Court reiterates that blocking orders can be issued under Section 69A read with the Blocking Rules, 2009, but Section 79 is to be read with Rule 3(1)(d) as a distinct and separate mechanism. This is done by the Hon’ble High Court for the reason that Section 69A “employs an elaborate procedure” which is not present in the Section 79 regime. The Hon’ble High Court notes that “with the rigamarole of procedure” under Section 69A and the Blocking Rules 2009 being followed, any unlawful content would have already caused damage [Para 16.11]. The judgment also expresses the Hon’ble High Court’s worry that the Petitioner seems to want to take a hands-off approach towards its responsibility for the algorithms that run on their platform [Para 16.12].
SFLC.in Analysis: The Hon’ble High Court’s observations with regard to the difference in operation of Section 69A and Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 are cause for concern. It must be emphasised that the Apex Court in Shreya Singhal upheld the constitutional validity of the blocking procedures under Section 69A read with the Blocking Rules, 2009 precisely because of its strict procedural safeguards, which the Supreme Court considered adequate to form a “reasonable restriction” on free speech. By framing this very same procedure as “rigamarole,” the Hon’ble High Court embarks on the dangerous exercise of validating a State action that subverts and side-steps established constitutional norms and judicial precedent.
8. Whether the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are essentially citizen-centric or extend to all persons? [Pages 249 – 274]
The Petitioner’s challenge draws its strength from Article 19 of the Constitution, hence the Hon’ble High Court deems it necessary to investigate whether the rights guaranteed under Article 19 are available to a foreign person or company. A bare perusal of the text is enough to indicate that these rights are available only to citizens of the country [Para 17.1]. Relying on Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta (1964) and Power Measurement Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (2003), the High Court opines that Article 19 rights are expressly withheld from foreign entities.
The judgment notes that while rights under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution are available to every person and not just citizens, a foreign entity cannot seek rights under Article 19 in the garb of protecting Articles 14 and 21. In the present challenge, the Petitioner projects that they have a right to make such a challenge under the umbrella of Article 14, but the challenge in effect leads to interpretation of Article 19, which is not available to the foreign company X Corp [Paras. 17.2 – 17.5].
X Corp, being a faceless entity operating as an intermediary in India, cannot challenge any laws on the grounds of Article 19. The Hon’ble High Court opines that if the Petitioner wants to operate in India, it has to abide by the domestic laws of the country. Similar attempts were made by the Petitioner before the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in X Corp v. Union of India (2023), and the coordinate Bench in the ruling expressly held that Articles 19 and 21 are not available to X Corp [Paras. 17.6 and 17.7]. The 2023 ruling was in keeping with a long line of judicial precedent, from Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India (1950) and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1964), to Star India (P) Ltd. v. TRAI (2007) and Indian Social Action Forum v. Union of India (2021). Relying on these precedents, the Hon’ble High Court in the present challenge reiterates that the Petitioner, being an artificial juristic entity, cannot challenge the constitutional validity of any law under the garb of Article 19, which is only available to individual citizens of the country [Paras. 17.8 – 17.12].
SFLC.in Analysis: The Hon’ble High Court appears to have overlooked the submission of the Intervenors that Article 19, even if unavailable to the Petitioner, remains unequivocally applicable to the intervening applicants, who are citizens of the country [Para 8.1]. The intervenors are engaged in protected speech under Article 19(1)(a), which can only be restricted by Article 19(2).
Moreover, the Hon’ble High Court does not appear to have addressed the concerns that the content subject to takedown may originate from citizens of India who benefit from the protection of Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution. By not fully considering this point, the judgement risks a narrow approach that could have long-term implications for the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression of citizens of India.
9. Whether the Sahyog portal envisaged under the Information Technology Act is ultra vires the parent enactment or whether it stands as a legitimate instrument in aid of statutory purpose? [Pages 274 – 295]
The Hon’ble High Court describes the portal as arising from Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 which specifies issuance of notification for executing orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000. Considering the written submissions of the Respondent, the Hon’ble High Court describes itself as satisfied by the elaborate justification placed on record by the Union. The Hon’ble High Court states that the difficulties faced by both law enforcement agencies and intermediaries, like the lack of reliable contact information, duplication of notices, delays, etc., demonstrates the pressing need for a centralised and standardised platform [Para 18.1].
Further, the Hon’ble High Court notes the Union’s submission that the power to issue binding blocking directions remains exclusively under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000 read with the Blocking Rules, 2009. Describing the Sahyog portal as an administrative channel to ensure efficiency and traceability, the Hon’ble High Court holds that the portal does not suffer from any unconstitutionality [Para 18.1].
On the arguments relating to Nodal Officers, the Hon’ble High Court observes that the post arises from the Blocking Rules, 2009. Further, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, via Office Memorandum dated 31.10.2023, has directed the designation of Nodal Officers for various Central and State Ministries and State Police Forces. This direction was made so as to create a framework for effective and timely removal of unlawful content under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule (3)(1)(d). The Hon’ble High Court finds that the designated Nodal Officer satisfies the definition of “agency” under these provisions and abides by Rule 4 of the Blocking Rules, 2009, which had been affirmed in Shreya Singhal. Finding thus, the Hon’ble High Court observes that the post of a Nodal Officer emanates from multiple intertwined enactments, with the solitary purpose of “handling unlawful content, information and activity in cyberspace.” The blocking of information in case of an emergency is also found in Rule 9 of the Blocking Rules, 2009. The Nodal Officers hand out notices to intermediaries to take down unlawful content from the platform of the intermediary [Para 19].
Examining one such notice made to the Nodal Officer of X Corp at Page 290, the High Court observes that the notices mention the URL to be disabled, the provisions under which the content is unlawful, and that the intermediary is directed to take down the information within 36 hours [Para 19]. The Hon’ble High Court notes that contrary to the submissions of the Petitioner, the Nodal Officer quotes the relevant penal provision in the takedown notice, indicating that orders are not issued as per their whim and fancy, but as per the operation of the law. The Hon’ble High Court states, “If illegality and unlawful information is floating on the platform and the Government … directs taking it down, it cannot be said to be an illegal order. They are orders in consonance with the law,” finding that the use of blocking power by Nodal Officers is within legal bounds [Para 20].
The Hon’ble High Court reiterates that the Petitioner is liable to comply with the American Take it Down Act in its home country, which also has detailed notice and removal requirements failing which the offence of ‘unfair or deceptive act or trade practice’ can be prosecuted under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Hon’ble High Court emphasises that it is not drawing a parallel between the Take it Down Act of the US and the IT Act, 2000 of India, but merely reminding the Petitioner that it complies with American acts but “wants to disobey the law of the Indian soil” [Para 21].
SFLC.in Analysis: The Hon’ble High Court has used the example of the Take it Down Act, 2025 to suggest that the Petitioner complies with American laws while disobeying Indian ones. However, the Take It Down Act specifically identifies the type of content that it is targeting (non-consensual intimate images) and provides a comprehensive definition for the same. The provisions of the IT Rules, 2021 being used here, on the contrary, use vague and overbroad language that has a greater potential to be misused to curb free speech.
Additionally, the criminal liability for prosecution under the Take it Down Act is more robust than the straitjacket loss of ‘safe harbour’ under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000. Under the American regulation, for offences concerning depiction of adults, prosecutors must establish that the defendant platform knowingly published the material, and that the publication has caused harm, or was intended to cause harm [Page 293]. In the present petition, the Petitioner has argued in favour of a similarly robust regulatory regime, instead of the overbroad regulation presented by Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000 in conjunction with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021.
10. In the contemporary digital milieu, where algorithms shape the flow of information, whether autonomy of such processes eclipses human agency – myth or reality? [Pages 296 – 299]
The Hon’ble High Court considers the contentions of the Petitioner that the platform X has no human hand, as it is all machine driven or artificial intelligence driven, and the refutations of the Respondent that the algorithm operated by the platform is operated through human intervention [Para 22.1]. Algorithms are often presented as neutral and free from human bias, but this is a myth. The reality, the High Court opines, is that these algorithms are conceived, designed, and trained by human beings, and they are therefore encoded extensions of human judgement [Para 22.2].
Algorithms are everywhere, and guide many everyday decisions of citizens. They have become instruments of power. Therefore, when unlawful content is found on an algorithmic platform like X, and the post gets picked up by the algorithm, the Petitioner cannot escape the law by relying on the algorithmic operation of its platform [Para 22.3]. From the constitutional point of view, such algorithms cannot be allowed to infringe on fundamental rights, and the law cannot abdicate its role merely because it is a technologically driven act. “Algorithms may be the new order of the day, the Constitutional demand is old” [Para 22.4].
11. Whether the menace of social media requires to be curbed and regulated? [Pages 299 – 345]
The Hon’ble High Court, relying on various scholarly articles and academic sources, attempts to describe the “menace generated by social media and the growing necessity to regulate it.” The Hon’ble High Court describes various negative effects that social media has on privacy and security of users, mental and physical health especially in youngsters, and social development of the country[Paras. 23 – 23.6]. It asserts that beyond these general ill effects, social media has exacerbated offences against women, pointing to the UN Secretary General’s report on technology-facilitated violence against women and girls, and other such reports [Paras. 23.6 and 23.7]. When social media platforms showcase illegal or unlawful content, the pressing question becomes whether such information should be permitted to remain until it becomes an active threat to society [Para 23.8]. Regulation, therefore, is not a matter of choice but a solemn obligation of the State to ensure the digital age does not become a lawless trampling grounds for women’s rights [Para 23.9].
Coming to the present petition, the Hon’ble High Court examines the Petitioner’s transparency report for August, 2025. As per the report several grievances have been brought forth to X Corp but it has not taken any adequate action. For example, the Hon’ble Court cites, “grievances pending for the month concerning child sexual exploitation is 31 and action taken is zero” [Para. 23.10]. The Hon’ble Court also notes that the Petitioner has challenged take down orders in Australia, Brazil, and the EU. Further, the blocking orders X Corp is challenging in India are not ambiguous in nature, and clearly delineate the offending material, the offense, and the action to be taken [Paras. 24.1 and 24.2].
The Hon’ble High Court observed that an account under the name “Supreme Court of Karnataka” had been left unsanctioned on X until it was brought to light during the present proceedings. However, when it was exposed, the account was deleted within a few minutes. The High Court asks how unlawful content can be allowed to remain on the platform after take down notices, when X Corp has the power to remove the offending material near-immediately [Para 24.3].
Concluding the judgement, the Hon’ble High Court states that a balance must be found “between the sacred liberty of free expression and the corrosive menace of misuse.” Warning that a menace cannot be allowed to fester under the guise of free speech, the Hon’ble High Court reiterates that when the Petitioner abides with the Take It Down Act in the US, it cannot challenge Indian regulation [Para 24.3].
SFLC.in Analysis: There is merit in the Hon’ble High Court’s findings regarding algorithms being conceived and trained by humans, and therefore being encoded extensions of human judgment, due to which ‘someone’ whether a company or a human must bear responsibility for the infringing act. There also exists strong evidence for the ill-effects of unregulated social media, particularly in cases of online gender-based violence, misinformation, and radicalization of the youth. However, this judgment effectively uses a machete to solve a problem that requires a scalpel. It is permitting the legislation to use overbroad and vague language in order to punish what it perceives to be a foreign company that doesn’t want to comply with Indian laws, while simultaneously omitting to consider the erosion of the fundamental rights that are guaranteed to Indian citizens.
Conclusion:
By upholding the use of the Sahyog Portal to take down content under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d), the Hon’ble High Court has effectively validated a parallel takedown regime that sidesteps the procedural safeguards built into Section 69A and the Blocking Rules, 2009. While the judgment does emphasize that the State has a solemn duty to curb online harms, it overlooks that these measures infringe on the rights of Indian citizens, setting a precedent where executive action faces fewer constitutional checks. In doing so, the ruling of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka may tilt the balance too far towards control at the cost of free speech.
